Definition
“Henceforth, when we talk about knowledge, we will have propositional knowledge in mind, unless explicitly stated otherwise.” - Pritchard, 2014, Ch. 1, pg. 14
“Two things that just about every epistemologist agrees on are that a prerequisite for possessing knowledge is that one has a belief in the relevant proposition, and that that belief must be true. ”
“In particular, I’m going to assume that truth is objective in the following sense: at least for most propositions, your thinking that they are true does not make them true. Whether or not the earth is round, for example, has nothing”

Further notes from conversations with Chappie

I have a question that addresses some fundamental gaps in the language of this textbook and epistemology at large: that is, how is Pritchard, in particular, utilizing the word "know"? as in more concretely, is he saying that 'to know AB' means to have a justified belief and that belief to be true?

This is an excellent question—and you’re absolutely right to flag it as a linguistic and conceptual gap rather than a simple definitional issue. You’re basically asking: what work is the word “know” actually doing in Pritchard’s framework? Let’s be very precise.

Short answer (but not glib)

No—Pritchard is not simply using “know” to mean [1. Nodes/justified true belief|justified true belief], and in fact much of What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? is structured to show why that equation fails and what must replace it.
But he also doesn’t abandon truth, belief, or justification. He reconfigures their roles.

Step 1: What Pritchard is not doing

Pritchard does not treat “knows that p” as shorthand for:

S believes p
p is true
S has justification for p

That classical Platonic/JTB gloss is introduced as a starting point, not as his working definition. He explicitly accepts the Gettier problem as decisive:

👉 Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge.

So when Pritchard says “S knows p,” he is not merely saying “S has a JTB.”

Step 2: What “know” minimally commits him to

Across the book, “know” is treated as a success term, which means:

• Truth is non-negotiable
  If p is false, S does not know p.
• Belief is required
  One cannot know p without believing p.
  So at minimum:

Knowledge = true belief + something else

That “something else” is where all the philosophical action is.

Step 3: Why justification is not the whole story

Pritchard is careful with the term justification, because it does two different jobs in epistemology:

1. Internalist justification
   – reasons the subject can access reflectively
2. Externalist justification
   – reliability, safety, or truth-tracking features of the belief-forming process

He argues that neither alone is sufficient.

• Pure internalism → Gettier vulnerability
• Pure externalism → epistemic luck, loss of rational agency

So when Pritchard uses “know,” he is not committed to justification in the traditional internalist sense.

Step 4: Pritchard’s positive view (simplified but accurate)

Pritchard ultimately endorses a hybrid account that combines:

1. Anti-luck condition

Knowledge must not be true by luck
(usually cashed out as a safety condition)

2. Epistemic ability / virtue

The belief must arise from the agent’s cognitive abilities

3. Reflective access (in perceptual cases)

In good cases, the subject can know why they know

This is where epistemic disjunctivism comes in.

Step 5: What “know” means operationally for Pritchard

A good working gloss—much closer to what he’s doing than JTB—is something like:

S knows that p if and only if
p is true,
S believes p,
S’s belief is the product of reliable cognitive abilities,
S’s belief is safe from error,
and (in paradigm cases) S has reflectively accessible, factive reasons for p.

This is not a formal definition he gives—but it tracks how he uses the term throughout the book.

Step 6: Why this matters for scepticism and closure

This answers your earlier worries about closure.
When Pritchard says:

“If S knows p…”

he is not saying:

“If S has a justified true belief that p…”

He is saying:

“If S is in a non-lucky, ability-exercising, truth-entailing epistemic position with respect to p…”

That’s why sceptical hypothesis matter so much:

• They threaten safety
• They threaten reflective access
• They threaten non-luck
  Closure becomes dangerous because “know” is this strong success term.

Step 7: Why the textbook can feel linguistically slippery

You’re absolutely right to feel that there’s a gap here.
Pritchard deliberately:

• uses ordinary “know” language
• avoids premature formal definitions
• lets competing theories pressure the term from different angles

This pedagogical choice can make it feel like:

“Wait—what exactly are we talking about when we say ‘know’?”

But that’s intentional: the book is showing that no single traditional definition survives scrutiny, while still insisting that “knowledge” is a real and important category.

Bottom line

To answer your question directly:

• ❌ Pritchard is not using “know” to mean justified true belief
• ✅ He treats knowledge as true belief plus anti-luck, ability, and (in key cases) reflectively accessible reasons
• ✅ “Know” is a success term, not merely an epistemic attitude
• ✅ The apparent vagueness is part of the philosophical work the book is doing

Thank you, Chappie.