Corlett. A, Analyzing Social Knowledge

Introduction
In this paper, I shall address the problem of the nature of collective propositional knowledge (or “knowledge that”), focusing on the question of whether or not decisionmaking groups can possess such knowledge, and, if so, under what conditions such knowledge obtains. I shall assume for the sake of discussion what I have argued at length in Analyzing Social Knowledge (Corlett 1996, 77–108); namely, that individual human cognizers in social contexts are possible subjects of social knowledge.

Summary
Corlett disqualifies random groups of people (TV watchers) as “collectives”, instead positing that only conglomerates qualify as epistemic subjects in his account of social knowledge. Making a distinction between groups of people such as TV watchers and conglomerates, Corlett states that one key difference between conglomerates and random groups is that, among other things, the members of conglomerates seek to form beliefs qua members of the groups to which they belong, beliefs that sometimes amount to decisions that in some cases form the basis of that conglomerate’s putative action related to that belief and decision.

Corlett argues that

a conglomerate knows p at a particular time to the extent that: 
(a) its members accept p at that time; 
|
(b) p is true at that time; 
|
(c) the group is justified in believing p at that time, which entails that the group is epistemically responsible in forming and accepting p at that time in light of any epistemic luck that might obtain 

Collective Belief
In Corlett’s treatise, collective belief is defined as a collective (not a conglomerate???) Sincerely assenting to a proposition without ambiguity. In the following framework Corlett establishes what constitutes a collective belief

a collective belief that:
p admits of degrees of strength, contingent on the number of group members who believe p at a particular time, and the extent to which they believe it, and why. 

As such Corlett states that

a decision-making group might well be self-deceived in its belief. That is, it might think that it has a strong belief that p at a particular time, perhaps based on its perception that each and every group member qua group member holds the particular belief. Yet, at the same time, there can be misunderstanding about the belief’s content among group members; whether or not the misunderstandings result from bad faith or unethical motives, for instance. Under such circumstances, the group cannot possess knowledge because it is doubtful that is has even formed a belief. (Pg. 235)

and that in order for a collective to be said to possess knowledge it must form a higher-order belief about the belief, devise and understand its reasons for the belief, and adopt it into its doxastic system.

Collective Justification
Based on the Platonic account of knowledge, Corlett states that collective propositional knowledge requires the accepted true belief be justified, providing the example of a government’s belief that it ought to protect its own belief is based on the foundational belief that its interests are of vital importance (see: dogmatic argument). Thus collective justification is prone to the problem of infinite regress.

Collective Epistemic Responsibility
Corlett claims that in order for a group to be epistemically responsible in duty, blameworthiness or praiseworthiness, it must “own” its belief and that

conglomerate assents to p at tn, without ambiguity

As a critical point of epistemic responsibility, Corlett states that a group must be open-minded and self reflective in its pursuit of truth and attempt to avoid error. As per to Corlett,

It is only by possessing these sorts of epistemic virtues that a group can deem itself sufficiently trustworthy to be considered one who believes according to reliable belief forming processes.